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Abstract 
In just a few weeks, COVID-19 appeared in China and quickly spread to the rest of the world, 
including Europe and the United States. Many have rushed to describe the outbreak as a ‘black 
swan’ – an unpredictable event with extremely severe consequences. However, COVID-19 was not 
only predictable ex post: it was amply predicted ex ante. This allows us to draw some preliminary 
lessons: 
• First, economic policy will need to shift from its current focus on efficiency, towards a greater 
emphasis on resilience and sustainability. 
• Second, a more centralised governance to address health emergencies is needed. 
• Third, Europe should create a centre for the prevention of large-scale risks. 
• Fourth, digital technologies, if handled with care, can be an important part of both a mitigation 
and a response strategy. 
• Fifth, Europe should improve its science advice and communication functions. 
Finally, there are many ways to pursue enhanced resilience and responsiveness, but not all of them 
are compatible with sustainability and democratic values. The challenge is to find an adequate 
policy mix, which safeguards individual rights and liberties, protects the economy, and at the same 
time strengthens government preparedness for cases of epidemics and pandemics. 
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COVID-19 was not predictable. It was predicted 
In just a few weeks, COVID-19 appeared in China and quickly spread to the rest of the world, 
including Europe and the United States. Many governments are facing tragic choices, such as 
imposing harsh containment and quarantine rules; choosing which patients to save and which 
ones to let die; or blindly betting on ‘herd immunity’ by letting the virus spread widely, no 
matter the death toll (as initially announced in the UK, although the government eventually 
made a U-turn). In a triumph of path-dependency, most EU member states have taken gradual, 
sparse and inconsistent steps, such as closing intra-EU borders and limiting the free circulation 
of medical devices and protective equipment. All of a sudden, the European Union, a project 
that took decades to build, is on the verge of collapse; trust between countries is declining, 
while trust between citizens is surprisingly on the rise. Fear of the unknown is leading citizens 
around the world to look for the solidarity of their neighbours, and gradually lose interest in 
what happens across the border. Investors are witnessing the most dramatic nosedive in the 
recent history of stock exchange indexes, while market operators start preparing for the worst 
economic crisis since World War II.  
Many have rushed to describe the outbreak as a ‘black swan’ – an unpredictable event with 
extremely severe consequences. This would make COVID-19 tantamount to the 2008 financial 
crisis, the dot.com bubble, or 9/11. However, there are at least two major differences between 
the current pandemic and these black swans. First, there is no evidence that the virus was man-
made: the debate thus focuses on the timeliness and effectiveness of the response, once the 
virus appeared. Second, black swans are defined as events that cannot be predicted 
beforehand, yet are considered predictable after the fact occurs. However, COVID-19 was not 
only predictable ex post: it was amply predicted ex ante. In other words, COVID-19 is no black 
swan; rather, it is a “grey rhino”, a massive threat that was to be expected, yet ignored despite 
repeated warnings. We should have seen it coming, and we should have been prepared. 
Clearly, we were not. 
Already in 2005, while testifying before the US Congress, scientific reporter Laurie Garrett 
warned that a “highly virulent, highly transmissible pandemic influenza that circulates the world 
repeatedly for more than a year” would end up killing more people than all the known weapons 
of mass destruction “save, perhaps, a thermonuclear exchange”; she observed that “scientists 
have long forecast the appearance of an influenza virus capable of infecting 40% of the world’s 
human population and killing unimaginable numbers”. A novel flu virus known as H1N1 ended 
up killing at least 18,500 people with some studies suggesting that the actual death toll could 
have been 15 times higher. Ten years later, Microsoft founder Bill Gates warned that the 
greatest risk of a global catastrophe would most likely be a highly infectious virus, rather than 
a war (“not missiles but microbes”); and that according to epidemiologists, “a fast-moving 
airborne pathogen could kill more than 30 million people in less than a year”. In 2016, the 
Report of the High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises” warned of a “fast-
spreading respiratory disease agent that could have a geographic scope, severity, or societal 
impact and could overwhelm national or international capacity to manage it”. One year later, 
widely read magazines such as Time and the Harvard Business Review warned of a staggering 
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lack of preparedness for the inevitable upcoming pandemic, and established a simple equation 
of fear: if there were an outbreak of a virus as deadly as Ebola and as contagious as flu, the 
world would fall to its knees.  
Only a few months ago, in September 2019, the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board (an 
independent monitoring and accountability body to ensure preparedness for global health 
crises, hosted by the WHO) was even more explicit, stating that “the world is not prepared for 
a fast-moving, virulent respiratory pathogen pandemic … The 1918 global influenza pandemic 
sickened one third of the world population and killed as many as 50 million people … If a similar 
contagion occurred today with a population four times larger and travel times anywhere in the 
world less than 36 hours, 50-80 million people could perish”. A simulation exercise in the US 
last October 2019 confirmed that “there are major unmet global vulnerabilities and 
international system challenges posed by pandemics that will require new robust forms of 
public-private cooperation to address”. Around the same time, the Global Health Security Index 
report reiterated the warning. 
Preparedness: international cooperation, domestic denial  
Preparedness has indeed been on the global agenda in recent years. The World Health 
Organisation (WHO) has worked intensively and extensively on pandemic preparedness, 
adapting its strategy based on the lessons learned from past outbreaks such as HIV, Ebola, 
H1N1, SARS; under its umbrella, a group of scientists developed a blueprint for R&D 
preparedness and response to public health emergencies due to highly infectious pathogens. 
Nonetheless, the current outbreak has shown that efforts to put in place an international 
response mechanism to cross-border health threats, which date back to the first International 
Sanitary Conference in 1851 and culminated in the WHO International Health Regulations in 
2005, are still far from succeeding. 
Against this backdrop, national governments have been very reluctant to invest in measures to 
tackle low-risk, high-consequence occurrences. In a world dominated by the quest for 
economic efficiency, with financial markets ready to award a premium to governments that 
reduce public spending and thereby taxes, there is little place for resilience-oriented policy. The 
resulting paradox is that those events that scare citizens the most are tackled by many 
politicians with a macabre taste for risk.  
Not surprisingly, as the scientific world was crying for more attention to the need to get 
prepared for a pandemic, the Trump administration was disbanding the global health security 
team, and virtually emptying out the Office of Science and Technology Policy. As the COVID-19 
outbreak was spreading to the United States, in proposing the new budget for 2021, the 
President continued his uninterrupted streak of proposed cuts to the National Institute for 
Health ($5 billion, a staggering 13% cut); the Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response 
($25 million), and the Hospital Preparedness Program ($18 million). In Europe, the financial 
crisis led many member states to impose drastic spending cuts on healthcare in almost every 
country; recently, Rechel (2019) confirmed evidence of cutbacks in many countries and “an 
 overall declining share of health expenditure going to public health” in the post-financial crisis 
period. As reported by the OECD, in Italy between 2000 and 2017, the number of hospital beds 
per capita decreased by about 30%, a trend that is present across all EU countries, contrary to 
what occurred in Korea and China (see Figure 1). Given the rigidity of most of public spending 
on healthcare, cuts inevitably end up affecting research, as well as overall preparedness 
strategies: as a result, ordinary administration is somehow (barely) guaranteed, but public 
authorities are playing a dangerous Russian roulette with events like COVID-19. Lombardy (a 
crown jewel of Italy when it comes to healthcare) is on the verge of collapse for lack of intensive 
care beds.  
Figure 1. Per capita hospital beds, EU28 (grey lines) v. China and South Korea (highlighted) 
 
Source: OECD.  
In Europe, the shortage of national investment was partly addressed through enhanced 
coordination at the EU level, through the creation of a dedicated agency, the European Centre 
for Disease Control (ECDC), in charge of strengthening Europe’s response and providing 
technical support for Europe and for EU member states. Consensus on the need for an ECDC 
emerged after the SARS outbreak in 2003, and the Centre already became operational in 2005. 
Its work was found to be relevant and meaningful in a recent external evaluation, which 
particularly praised the relevance of the Centre’s activities during the Zika and Ebola outbreaks. 
However, the same document also reported weaknesses “in the Centre’s capacity to adapt to 
changes in the member states, particularly reduced national public health spending”; and that 
the Centre has not been able to adequately cover its staff costs and hire additional staff. Most 
worrying is the reported lack of adequate cooperation by member states, in particular in the 
Epidemic Intelligence Information System (EPIS), and also in the European Surveillance System 
(TESSy). 
In summary, the global governance of threats from pandemics appears too fragmented and 
insufficiently coordinated. Most countries are wildly unprepared, and the global or regional 
coordination mechanisms appear too weak to effectively prevent collective action problems, 
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as well as fragmented and sparse reactions, to proliferate. In Europe, the ECDC is likewise 
insufficiently endowed to effectively coordinate member states in providing a meaningful 
response. As in many global governance settings, the current situation can easily lead to 
collective action problems, as well as strategic behaviour.  
Early insights from the outbreak 
The fact that the pandemic was amply foretold, and yet was not adequately tackled, allows us 
to draw some preliminary lessons.  
First, economic policy will need to shift from its current focus on efficiency, towards a greater 
emphasis on resilience and sustainability. Reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience are 
also essential in response to other threats, such as climate change. In many sectors of the 
economy, including network industries and public services like healthcare, the quest for cost 
cutting and short-term economic efficiency has led to a dramatic lack of redundancy in most 
critical infrastructures, including healthcare. Increasing resilience won’t be possible if 
worldwide, international institutions continue to pursue a campaign for unconditional fiscal 
discipline, and financial markets continue to be tied to quarterly reports on public spending. 
The same applies to the European Semester: reorienting it towards sustainable development, 
as the von der Leyen Commission seems willing to do, would require providing more visibility 
to existing health, social inclusion and sustainability indicators as well as adding new indicators 
and monitoring tools, including a careful planning of preparedness for health and other risks 
(see below). So far, despite the emphasis on a “Triple A” for social policy in the Juncker 
Commission, the Stability and Growth Pact has largely prioritised fiscal discipline over 
resilience-oriented investment.  
Second, a more centralised governance to address health emergencies is needed. The COVID-
19 outbreak has shown the need for more coordination in the way EU responds to global health 
threats. The quality and coordination of information flows during an emergency like the one 
currently experienced in Europe and the world is of the essence. The recent evaluation of EPIS 
has shown important flaws, mostly on the side of member states. The voluntary nature of this 
multi-level cooperation resembles closely the lack of full coordination experienced in a 
neighbouring field, cyber security (Griffith et al., 2019). Moreover, the shortage of medical 
devices and medicines, an already existing problem in the EU, became more apparent and 
critical in the current emergency: problems in the supply of ventilators, protective masks and 
medicines have exposed existing gaps and revealed opportunities for Europe to act more 
effectively. A strategic stockpile of medical devices (rescEU) has now been set up to address 
the emergency: this, however, occurred only after member states attempted to implement 
export bans for critical medical equipment, ignoring any form of solidarity. A stronger role of 
the EU would have been advisable also with respect to the plethora of policy measures adopted 
at all levels of government to contain and delay the spread of the virus. Social distancing, travel 
bans and other similar measures are thought to be ineffective or even dangerous unless 
enacted in a concerted and coordinated way. The EU has now issued ad hoc recommendations 
 on testing strategies and community measures, but this took far too long, putting individuals 
and healthcare systems unnecessarily at risk. 
Third, Europe should create a centre for the prevention of large-scale risks. It is important to 
avoid the repetition of a ‘panic-neglect-panic’ cycle in the face of crisis. On the one hand, 
Europe must avoid adopting a ‘disease by disease’ strategy: as suggested in 2016 by a UN High-
level Panel that reviewed the experience with the Ebola outbreak, governments should avoid 
the temptation to emphasise ‘vertical’ programmes focusing on specific diseases or too narrow 
policy considerations (e.g., pandemic preparedness); and prioritise comprehensive, whole of 
government programmes aimed at strengthening all aspects of their national health system. 
On the other hand, Europe must also avoid a ‘threat by threat’ siloed strategy: even if COVID-
19 was not man-made, the extent of the disruption it is creating will certainly entice 
bioterrorists; and it is clear that the rising role of digital technology in supplementing economic 
activities could make a combined attack (biological and digital) lethal for the world economy. 
The mounting awareness that most cyberattacks are hybrid (military and civilian) should spread 
towards analysing the likelihood of multi-vector attacks. Against this background, even if it has 
already engaged in extensive risk mapping, Europe does not have a dynamic, agile centre for 
the prevention of catastrophic risks. The use of high-performance computers, large datasets 
and advanced risk-analysis techniques can support resilience in Europe without requiring 
massive investment in new facilities and infrastructure for each sector. The Centre could 
coordinate with existing non-executive agencies in specific sectors (e.g. ENISA, ECDC, ESMA, 
EBA) to alert policymakers on outstanding threats and evolving risks, including multi-vector 
ones. With such a support network, the European Commission could create an executive 
structure that would coordinate emergency response by identifying the most effective 
sequence of measures, and possible redistribution of materials and resources across member 
states to ensure the resilience of the whole Union. 
Fourth, digital technologies, if handled with care, can be an important part of both a mitigation 
and a response strategy. Technology is enabling the continuation of economic activity (via 
telework) and social relationships (via videoconferencing and social networking). And had 
COVID-19 occurred in a few years from now, many economic activities would have been 
replaced through the use of the Internet of Things (Laurer and Renda 2020), thanks to drone 
delivery, remotely managed smart factories and farms, autonomous vehicles and virtual and 
extended reality. Digital technology will also be essential in diagnosing COVID-19 (for example, 
in China by training a petascale supercomputer to identify the CT-scans of pneumonic patients 
with COVID-19); finding a cure (IBM’s Summit has identified 77 promising compounds to be 
tested by medical researchers out of a total of 8,000, in just a couple of days as opposed to 
months); and monitor the effectiveness of lockdown and isolation measures.  
Fifth, Europe should improve its science advice and communication functions. Scientific advice 
is key for guiding action, but it is also a very complex task. The COVID-19 outbreak is a 
paradigmatic example of how science advice is needed in the face of uncertainty and 
potentially catastrophic risk. While governments need to act in a timely manner in these 
circumstances, the truth is that many questions about the current outbreak remain 
unanswered (among others, the animal origin and reservoir of the virus, the dynamics of 
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transmission and especially the role of asymptomatic transmission, and the influence of 
different risk factors). The ECDC, the Scientific Advice Mechanism and the Joint Research 
Centre of the European Commission should become more effective in combining sound 
knowledge and research with science communication abilities, enabling the Commission to 
effectively avoid the proliferation of disinformation and sparse, mystified narratives 
throughout the Union. This would also help the EU avoid politicians at the national level being 
too easily tempted to shift the responsibility of organisational and logistic problems onto the 
European level, when this is not backed by any evidence. 
Finally, there are many ways to pursue enhanced resilience and responsiveness, but not all of 
them are compatible with sustainability and democratic values. The challenge is to find an 
adequate policy mix, which safeguards individual rights and liberties, protects the economy, 
and at the same time strengthens government preparedness for cases of epidemics and 
pandemics. Building healthcare facilities at the national level based on the (current) needs 
during a pandemic outbreak, makes little sense from a policy perspective; increasing capacity 
should rather be part of a more comprehensive preparedness strategy that includes the ability 
to quickly react and increase the number of beds, ventilators or other healthcare facilities in 
times of emergency. Overstocking medicines at national level is less efficient than doing it at 
the pan-European level. Using technology to track the movement of citizens, as done in China, 
is incompatible with individual liberties and fundamental rights, and can give rise to widespread 
social discrimination over time. In the current emergency, the EU has a chance to show that 
risk management and governance is possible without sacrificing individual fundamental rights 
and jeopardising solidarity and the bloc’s commitment to sustainable development. The 
President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, faces an uphill battle as member 
states repeatedly fail to resist the temptation of closing the borders and refuse to cooperate 
with neighbours. The COVID-19 emergency is thus becoming an existential challenge for the 
“geopolitical Commission”. A cutting-edge approach to risk detection, analysis and 
management coupled with far-reaching economic stimuli, the responsible use of technology 
and the commitment to openly sharing research solutions can preserve the role of the EU as a 
guiding light in these troubled times.  
This is, of course, a non-exhaustive list of possible measures that would contribute to better 
governance and preparedness in the years to come. And they are measures to be adopted in 
quieter times: as John F. Kennedy once famously said, the time to fix the roof is when the sun 
is shining. It is essential that, once COVID-19 gradually disappears, the lessons learned from 
these months of lockdown become the foundations of a new approach to risk governance at 
the EU and global level. The Global Preparedness Monitoring Board raised this same issue very 
clearly in its latest annual report: “for too long, we have allowed a cycle of panic and neglect 
when it comes to pandemics: we ramp up efforts when there is a serious threat, then quickly 
forget about them when the threat subsides”.  
So, let us not forget these days of lockdown, may they not be in vain. And let us use our best 
abilities to develop more effective ways to ensure our society remains resilient in the face of 
future risks.  
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